Introducing Stephen Butterfill
I’m very happy to introduce Stephen Butterfill, who will be joining us as a Featured Scholar on the blog this week. Steve holds a DPhil and BPhil in Philosophy from the University of Oxford and is...
View ArticlePhilosophical issues in cognitive science
Many thanks to Kristina and John for inviting me to write. I should say right at the start that most of what I’ll be writing draws heavily on ideas arising from collaborations with Ian Apperly,...
View ArticleAre There Visual Experiences of Red?
Instead of answering this question directly, I want to start with another question, one that motivates asking the question of my title. How do humans first come to know about the categorical colour...
View ArticlePhenomenal Expectations and the Developmental Origins of Knowledge of Objects
This is a post about a problem. How do largely informationally encapsulated processes ever nonacidentally operate in harmony with thinking? I will suggest that phenomenal expectations provide least...
View ArticleIntroducing Jennifer Nagel
I am very excited to be introducing Jennifer Nagel, who will be guest-blogging here as our current “Featured Scholar” over the next couple of weeks. Jennifer holds a PhD in philosophy from the...
View ArticleTalking about knowing
I’m surprised to find myself here. I started out in philosophy as a very old-fashioned epistemologist, concerned with the question of how necessary truths are known, and I think there was a whole...
View ArticleKnowledge and true belief
The goal of the post-Gettier Analysis of Knowledge program was to come up with a good X to plug into the formula “Knowledge = True Belief + X”, where X itself didn’t illicitly smuggle in the concept of...
View ArticleFactive verbs and factive mental states
My last post went back to babies, to see if the dawn of mental state attribution might show us something about the relationship between knowledge and belief. Even for those who take the concept of...
View ArticleThe lingering appeal of knowledge
My first post in this series observed that (if usage is any guide) adults attribute knowledge an awful lot. My most recent post hinted that knowledge attribution might be a necessary bridge to reach...
View ArticleGettier cases revisited
Knowing is a state of mind that can’t be wrong. If anyone knows that p, then p must be the case. My last post raised the question of why adults attribute that state of mind so heavily, in their...
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